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COMMENTS
The Promised Land: Analysis of
Environmental Factors of United States
Investment in and Development of the
Amazon Region in Brazil
The vastness and richness of the Amazon jungle is limited today
only by the extent of mankind's current discoveries. Originally consist-
ing of 1.2 billion acres of giant tropical hardwood trees, an unequaled
potential for hydro-electric power, and untapped minerals and precious
stones from diamonds to bauxite and iron ore, the Amazon is fertile
ground for foreign investment and development.' Moreover, the hopes
of the Brazilian people, staggering under a tremendous balance-of-
trade deficit combined with runaway inflation and widespread poverty,
depend on the effective development of the Amazon River basin.2 In
the past decade, however, it has become increasingly obvious to scien-
tists, businessmen, and government officials that unchecked exploita-
tion of the Amazon could bring about the greatest environmental
disaster of the century.3 The seemingly indestructible jungle has been
discovered to be an exceedingly fragile ecosystem which, once cleared,
could turn into rock-hard wasteland.4 Brazil needs the use of a produc-
tive Amazon basin not only for continued economic development, but
also for the agricultural production necessary to serve its massive popu-
1 See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
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lation.5 Consequently, regional and global economic, social, and envi-
ronmental consequences of the deforestation of the jungle have
recently come to be matters of international concern.6 The value and
fragility of the Amazon jungle make a strong case for rational, regu-
lated management of this important resource.
This comment will look at the social, economic, and environmen-
tal situation pertaining to the Amazon region, the present regulation
and policy, and foreseeable future trends, from three vantage points.
The Brazilian perspective is one of conflicting interests, with the coun-
try's dramatic need for economic development balanced against its
need to prevent the Amazon, its most valuable resource, from total de-
struction.7 The international perspective is one of increasing awareness
of the global impact of the deforestation of tropical moist forests, and
the need to develop and implement regional and international policies
to manage this resource.' The United States perspective considers the
advantages and disadvantages of unilateral state action to regulate
transnational corporations' environmental conduct overseas.' The
United States Government has a unique position of influence stemming
from its ability to regulate transnational corporations based in the
United States, and its opportunity to serve as a model for other nations
and facilitate international action.10
I. THE BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE
A. Economic and Social Setting in Brazil
To make an accurate assessment of the environmental factors re-
lating to investment in and development of the Amazon region, one
must have a basic understanding of Brazil's political, economic, and
social setting and of the complex ecosystem of the Amazon rain forest.
Brazil, the sixth largest country in the world, occupying nearly half of
the continent of South America, has justifiably been called the most
dynamic developing nation in the world. 1 Following a 1964 military
coup and the resulting relative political stability, Brazil entered a pe-
riod of rapid economic growth unsurpassed by any country in recent
5 See infra note 54.
6 See infra notes 122-79 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 11-121 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 122-79 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 180-245 and accompanying text.
10 Id




times.' u The nation raised its gross national product by an average of
ten percent per year from 1968 to 1974, and averaged an annual indus-
trial growth rate of 8.3% between 1968 and 1978.13 With its "we-can-
solve-anything" attitude' 4 and the vast resources of the Amazon jungle
at its disposal, many see Brazil as close to becoming a legitimate world
power.' 5 Yet, the country has extreme economic and social problems.
Brazil's importation of all the oil it consumes gives it the largest foreign
debt in the world. 6 The country has an annual inflation rate of 110%.1
7
These factors, along with the government's frequent and often contra-
dictory reactions to economic pressures, have created an uncertain eco-
nomic and political climate which is as difficult to evaluate as to
predict. For example, the Business International Corporation's weekly
report to managers in Latin America highlighted the Brazilian business
outlook as consisting of slower economic growth, gains against infla-
tion, and political stability. 8 Less than six months later, the same re-
port cited continued growth, relentless inflation, and contentious
politics as the highlights of Brazil's business outlook.' 9 Likewise, the
social problems do not lend themselves to easy answers. "Satellite"
slums populated by the desperately poor ring all of Brazil's major cit-
ies. Thirty million impoverished people live in the northeast region
alone.2 0 The country's population continues to grow, requiring more
agricultural land to feed it.2 Many people, including many in govern-
ment, feel that distribution of land to the poor is essential to prevent a
food shortage, as well as to forestall an agrarian class revolt.2 Just as
North Americans looked west one hundred years ago, Brazilians of all
classes are looking west today to the vast resources of the Amazon for-
est as their "promised land."2 3 Active and wise development of the
Amazon region is not merely a goal for the Brazilian people; it is a
necessity for survival.
12 Id at 39.
13 Brazil Stresses Farming and Enrolls its Afiracle' Worker, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1979, at A2,
coL 3.
14 Kelly & London, 'The Last Frontier'beckons Brazilians, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 23, 1981,
at 5, col. I [hereinafter cited as Kelly & London, The Last Frontier].
15 Kelly & London, Conquest of the Amazon, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 22, 1981, at 70, col. 1.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 1980 Bus. LATIN AM. (Bus. INT"L CoRP.) 60 (Feb. 20, 1980).
19 Id at 252.
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B. The Amazon Jungle
The immensity of the Amazon jungle and the vast amount of un-
tapped resources contained in it support the Brazilian view of the re-
gion as the country's salvation. Amazonia occupies one-half of Brazil.
If it were a country, it would be the ninth largest in the world.24 The
Amazon river network is the world's largest. Ocean liners can navigate
it 2,300 miles inland, and the river has tremendous potential as a source
of hydroelectricity.25 Rich, tropical hardwood lumber grows in a seem-
ingly unending supply.26 The jungle contains an abundance of valua-
ble minerals and metals, including bauxite, tin, gold, and diamonds, as
well as more plants and animal species than anywhere else on earth.27
Over 100 inches of rainfall annually, along with the rapid growth and
apparent indestructibility of the tropical forest, create the impression of
an ideal land for both logging and farming.28 However, tropical moist
forests are not the resilient ecosystems they appear to be, but are ex-
ceedingly fragile.2 9 Since the early 1950s Brazil has become painfully
aware of the fallacy of thinking that the density and richness of the
forest is evidence of fertile soil beneath it. In the warm moist climate of
the tropical forest, leaves and dead wood quickly decompose as they
fall to the ground, and the shallow root systems immediately recycle
the minerals back into the trees. The soil itself attains neither depth
nor richness in nutrients.3 °
Where modem civilization has disrupted this delicate, finely-tuned
system, severe ecological damage has followed. Slash and burn clear-
ing of land for farming or ranching has often rendered vast amounts of
land useless for its intended purpose.3' Nutrients released by this
method of clearing create fertile soil for two or three years. Once the






29 Myers, Corporate Destruction of Tropical Forests, 36 Bus. & Soc'Y Rav. 9, 11 (1980-81).
30 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON 28-29 (Brazilian Consulate 1976). The Amazon forest con-
sists mainly of varying levels of trees which form an impenetrable canopy when viewed from
below or above. The roots of the trees seldom penetrate more than a few feet beneath the surface
and often trees are supported as much by the clinging vines which stretch from tree to tree as by
their roots. These huge trees grow in soil which is only a few inches deep and almost completely
devoid of essential nutrients. The plant nutrients are held in the trees themselves, not in the soil.
Id
31 Id
32 2 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & U.S. STATE DEP'T., THE GLOBAL 2000 RE-




frequent intense tropical rains, now unimpeded, cause further loss of
nutrients through erosion and leaching of the soil.3 Other methods of
land clearing appear no less destructive. Agent Orange, the chemical
defoliant used widely by United States forces in Vietnam, is reportedly
available in farm supply stores in the Amazon region where it is used to
clear land for cultivation.34 Agent Orange has been linked with birth
defects and miscarriages, and is banned in the United States.35  The
danger of this toxic pollutant is increased as runoff carries it into water
supplies. Another technique, the correntao, involves enormous tractors
dragging very large chains through the forest uprooting everything in
their paths.36 This method also opens the soil to erosion and nutrient
depletion, rendering the land useless within a few years. Brazil's need
for ever-increasing agricultural production has caused the government
to begin to share scientists' and environmentalists' deep concerns over
environmental problems in the Amazon. 7
As with farming, the physical destruction of the tropical forest
from logging is great. Careless logging destroys from one- to two-
thirds of the unharvested trees in a tropical forest.38  Further, when a
cleared area is not replanted within a short time, the wind, rain, and
sun turn the land into a hard-baked, infertile wasteland.3 9 There are a
variety of less destructive logging methods known and available to jun-
gle logging companies.40 However, corporations have little incentive to
33 Id The Brazilian government learned this environmental lesson the hard way in its Bra-
gantina project of the early 1900s. The government colonized a 12,000 square mile area near
Belem for the purpose of food production. As areas were cleared, the land provided two or three
years of good harvests before the soils were exhausted and the farmers had to move on. By 1950,
all of the original forest was gone and the farmers started clearing the secondary growth forests.
However, this land produced only one good harvest. The area is now a wasteland where only
vigorous weeds and scrub vegetation survive. THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 29-
30.
34 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 324.
35 Id
36 Id
37 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 29-30.
38 Myers, supra note 29, at 10. Tropical moist forests contain a tremendous variety of tree
species, some more valuable than others as lumber. Unfortunately, similar trees do not grow
together in groups like trees in a temperate forest area. Approximately 10-30% of the trees are
commercially valuable; the rest are mere impediments to loggers. Thus, the selecting and cutting
of quality timber is initially very costly. Moreover, since commercially valuable trees are often the
tallest ones, with shallow roots and strong interconnecting vines, felling and extracting these trees
is extremely destructive. 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 131. Damaged but not un-
rooted trees are highly susceptible to pathogens. Thus, a minor injury to their bark can cause
irreparable damage and death. Myers, supra note 29, at 10.
39 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 322.
40 Myers, supra note 29, at 11. Techniques for minimizing environmental damage include:
1. logging relatively narrow strips and leaving wide strips untouched;
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increase the time and expense of lumbering.4 1 Forestry is a capital in-
tensive activity; the more timber extracted, the lower the unit cost.42
Further, foreign corporations are driven by high interest rates and a
fear of strict government regulation or even expropriation to try to ex-
ploit the jungle for immediate profits. 43 For these reasons, a corpora-
tion is likely to be indifferent to the host country's long term welfare.
C. Development of the Amazon Region
It is against the backdrop of potentially conflicting dilemmas-the
serious economic and social problems of a developing nation versus the
potential destruction of the country's most valuable resource, its
"promised land" for a better life-that Brazilian programs to develop
and protect the Amazon region must be evaluated. Further, it must be
recognized that environmentalists and "no-growth" groups in the de-
veloped western world have a perspective very different from that of a
government of a third world country desperately in need of develop-
ment for political, economic, and social reasons, and from the profit-
maximizing multinational corporation that takes on the task of devel-
opment.' Thus, legitimate local, regional, and global environmental
concerns must be balanced against harsh economic and social realities
to determine their true importance.
The recent history of Amazon development began following the
1964 military coup, when after a visit to the region, President Castello
Branco decided to launch "Operation Amazonia" in 1966. The Super-
intendency for the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM) was created
to supervise the development progress.45 SUDAM has endeavored to
achieve the dual goals of development and protection of Amazonia by
private industry and individuals, mainly through financial incentives,
including tax breaks, easier credit and low interest loans, and direct
2. careful directional felling;
3. severing clinging vines before felling-a method that will reduce damage by 20% at a cost
of three dollars per tree;
4. using helicopters to extract logs by air,
5. engaging biologists to collect plant and animal specimens as the logging operation pene-
trates deep into the forest.
Id
41 Id at 12.
42 Id
43 Id
44 Gross & Scott, Comparative Environmental Legislation andAction, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
619, 621 (1980).
45 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 8. SUDAM is basically a federal agency
established to develop plans to encourage private investment and to coordinate the development
of public agencies in the Amazon region. Id
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subsidies.4 6 This method is consistent with the Brazilian government's
economic philosophy of "free enterprise, liberally dosed with official
planning and outright intervention in economic affairs, plus tax policies
geared to channel private-sector investment into priority areas."4 7
Over the years, Brazil has continued to maintain a favorable view of
foreign investment.48 An advertising brochure for foreign corporations
from the Office of the Minister of Mines and Minerals describes the
government's encouragement of a "competitive race" among interna-
tional businessmen for the resources of Amazonia.49 This attitude gen-
erally predominates at present, though environmental, political, and
nationalistic pressures have decreased the popularity of the transna-
tional corporation as a tool for development. Cutbacks in foreign in-
vestment incentives have resulted.50
D. Development Incentives
In the first five years of SUDAM's existence, the government in-
troduced a series of tax concessions to stimulate private industry inter-
est. Under Law 5174, registered companies received a fifty percent
reduction in tax liabilities so long as the money saved was invested in
agriculture, cattle breeding, or basic industrial projects approved by
SUDAM as necessary to the development of the Amazon region.51 In-
dividuals or corporations which invested in a project approved by
SUDAM were entitled to reduce their income tax liabilities by an
amount equal to the sum invested, up to fifty percent of their total in-
come tax bill. Both new and existing industries in the region received
tax exemptions"2 and deductions. Customs duty on imported equip-
46 Id See also infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
47 Brazil, INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD (Bus. INT'L CORP.)
§ 1.02, at 2 (Dec. 1980) [hereinafter cited as IL&T].
48 Id § 1.05.
49 Kelly & London, The Last Frontier, supra note 14. United States billionaire Daniel Lud-
wig's massive $700,000,000 development project on the Jari River, deep in the Amazon jungle, is a
case in point. Encouraged by the cheap price of land and the incentive plans of a cooperative
Brazilian government, Ludwig purchased approximately 875,000 acres (the amount of land is now
in dispute), bulldozed the jungle, began mining bauxite and kaolin, floated a giant pulp mill pre-
built in Japan all the way to the Jari River and began production, built communities with a popu-
lation of 30,000 in 1979, connected them with a road and rail system, and imported foreign spe-
cialists to run the project. Ludwig was clearly a front runner in the competitive race as of 1979.
Hoge, U.,S. Magnate, Once Assailed, Is Hailedfor Amazon Project, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1979, at
A2, col. 3. But see infra note 117.
50 IL&T, supra note 47, § 1.02.
51 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 8.
52 Tax holidays ranging from 5 to 20 years were granted. IL&T, supra note 47, § 10.04.
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ment and machinery was waived.53 There were very few limits on the
range of investments eligible: industry, mining, lumbering, agriculture,
cattle raising, and others were included.54 Any talk about maintaining
the ecological balance of the Amazon region was mostly lip service.
According to Planning Minister Antonio Delfim Netto, "Brazil [had]
no time for ecology." 55
Today, Brazil has cut back its once broad range of federal and
regional incentives for industrial and agricultural projects. The reasons
range from a desire to increase tax revenues and cut bureaucratic red
tape, to a desire to increase national control over Amazon industry in
response to political and environmental pressure, and to a realization
that some incentives were ineffective or, on the other hand, had already
accomplished their purpose. The indirect tax concessions and exemp-
tions on import duties for a wide range of industries were severely lim-
ited.56 Now, partial reduction of import duties (up to eighty percent) is
generally granted only to priority projects in Amazonia which are ap-
proved by SUDAM. 57 Incentives formerly available for mining
projects have been eliminated.58 The range of investment projects in
which companies could previously promise to invest in in return for a
fifty percent tax cut have been limited to only those in Amazonia which
SUDAM designates.59 Presently, SUDAM tends to favor investment
projects presented by Brazilian firms over those of foreign companies.6"
This limits not only a transnational corporation's possibilities for in-
vestment, but also its opportunity to receive SUDAM-backed invest-
ment funds for its projects.
61
Nonetheless, many of the more valuable incentives still remain.
Import duties on equipment for approved priority projects can still be
reduced up to eighty percent.62 Corporations can still receive a tax cut
of fifty percent for expansions of their business approved by
53 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, upra note 30, at 10.
54 Id At the same time, the establishment of more easily obtainable loans and cheaper credit
(especially to small farmers), minimum prices for farm products, and government subsidized co-
operatives encouraged an increase in both individual and corporate agricultural activities in the
Amazon basin. Brazil Stresses Farming and Enrolls its "Miracle' Worker, N.Y. Times, May 9,
1979, at A2, col. 3.
55 Kelly & London, The Last Frontier, supra note 14.
56 IL&T, supra note 47, at 21, 23.
57 Id § 10.01.
58 Id
59 Id § 10.04.
60 Id § 10.02.
61 Id
62 Id §§ 10.01, 10.06.
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SUDAM.63 Likewise, they can still get a fifty percent reduction if the
money saved is invested in a priority project as designated by SUDAM
(an increasingly more restricted area).' Individual income tax can still
be reduced by thirty to sixty percent for investment in shares of compa-
nies with operating schemes approved by SUDAM.6 s Further, there is
still a ten year tax holiday for new companies in the SUDAM area or
for existing companies in the region that began substantial expansion,
modification, or diversification of their businesses before December 31,
1982.66 The government has also developed a scheme of "risk con-
tracts" to attract transnational corporations for oil exploration67 and
large scale logging operations.68 These contracts, in essence, reward
the corporation for success in risky ventures which the government
views as essential to the growth of Brazil. For instance, if a company
discovers oil, it may participate in the development of the newly dis-
covered deposit and take a percentage of the oil as payment for its ef-
forts.69 SUDAM also has identified approximately 100 million
additional acres (between five and ten percent of the Amazon region)
for timber exploitation.70 Among investment projects readily available
to corporations to qualify for tax reductions are programs for reforesta-
tion.71 The retention of incentives for this project is but one indication
of the increasing awareness in Brazil of the need to preserve the Ama-
zon River basin.
E. Environmental Protection
Many in Brazil, including people high in the government, have
begun to realize that Brazil cannot afford to destroy the Amazon forest
for the sake of development. In spite of the growing interest, environ-
mental legislation has been very limited in its effects. Legislation
passed early in SUDAM's career allows the financing of projects only if
63 PINHEIRO, NETO & CIA, DOING BusINESs IN BRAZIL 195 (rev. 3, 1981).
64 IL&T, supra note 47, § 10.04.
65 PINHEIRO, NETro & CIA, supra note 63, at 196.
66 Id Of course, there always exists the unofficial incentive of tax cheating. While returns on
investments in the capital city of Brasilia are taxed at a rate of up to 50%, in the less accessible
regions of the Amazon basin, the tax man can be paid off for as little as five percent of the bill.
Kelly & London, New Jungle Cry. "Amazon is Money, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at 4,
col. 1.
67 1980 Bus. LArIN AM. (Bus. INt'L CORP.) 2 (Jan. 2, 1980).
68 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 330.
69 1980 Bus. LATIN AM. (BUS. INT'L CORP.) 2 (Jan. 2, 1980).
70 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 330.
71 IL&T, supra note 47, § 10.04.
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they leave fifty percent of the natural forest cover intact.72 However,
this law is virtually unenforced and unenforceable. 7 The government
has acted directly to preserve parts of the Amazon River basin by de-
claring them to be national parks, forest reserves, and animal
reserves.7 4 As of 1976, over 169,000 square kilometers had been desig-
nated as animal reserves, and Amazonia National Park, covering ten
million square kilometers (approximately 2.5 million acres), had been
established.75 President Jodo Baptista Figueiredo, who was elected in
1979 as Brazil moved toward becoming a parliamentary democracy,
established three more national parks during his first six months in of-
fice.76 In spite of the progress made in this area, less than one-fourth of
one percent of the Amazon region has been set aside for protection.
The most ambitious current proposal for conservation in the Amazon
basin would set aside five percent of the region for parks and reserves.77
A number of well-respected government centers do research for the
Amazon region. These centers study engineering, agriculture,
medicine, transportation, agronomy, forestry, fishing, and other prob-
lem areas relating to the Amazon basin. However, the centers are un-
derstaffed, severely hampering their effectiveness.
78
Reforestation of the jungle has been a keynote of the country's
environmental policy since the 1966 enactment of Law 5106. Strong
tax incentives, up to a fifty percent tax break for companies engaged in
reforestation or for companies that reinvested the tax savings in the
reforestation project,79 achieved noticeable results.80 Corporations and
large landowners took advantage of the savings by planting a substan-
tial number of softwood trees, trees that would be suitable for the pro-
duction of the wood pulp used to make paper.8 ' With these incentives,
the amount of land replanted annually in Brazil reached three times
the goal set by the Food and Agriculture Organization for all of Latin
72 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 30.
73 Kelly & London, New Jungle Cry. 'Amazon is Money,' supra note 66.
74 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 30.
75 Id
76 Governments Move to Stem Amazon Destruction, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1979, at C3, col 1.
77 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 330-31.
78 Kelly & London, Science Racing Time in Amazon, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 26, 1981, at 4,
coL 1. The Manaus National Institute for Amazon Research has a staff of 40 highly regarded
Ph.D. researchers. However, staffers feel they need at least 250 more researchers, or they will
continue to fall further behind in their race to understand the jungle and to save some of it before
it is completely cut down. Id
79 IL&T, supra note 47, § 10.04.
80 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 326.
81 THE WORLD OF THE AMAZON, supra note 30, at 30.
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America. 82 While these incentives have been cut back since 1978-
mainly by SUDAM's greater selectivity in granting approval--they
continue to make investment opportunities attractive, especially in light
of the even larger cutbacks and restrictions in other tax incentives.
8 3
A more subtle factor limiting the success of the reforestation pro-
gram involves the economic and ecological effects of planting large
amounts of softwood groves. The groves are incompatible with the
jungle's original ecosystem, which consists of a variety of different
hardwoods, randomly scattered throughout the forest. This intensive
silviculture84 in tropical regions has a number of serious problems asso-
ciated with it, including the time it takes for trees to grow, making re-
search more difficult and substantially delaying a return on
investment."5 The doubtful forest management methods now in prac-
tice create additional environmental problems in the fragile tropical
forest.86 As a result, investors tend to consider tropical silviculture an
unproven technology. Most transnational forest product corporations
do not expect tropical commercial planting before the 1990s.87
82 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 326. The United States Embassy in Brazil Re-
port on Forestry Trends called the program a twelve year success story. The number of trees
planted by the 500 companies engaged in reforestation under the program was annually seven to
ten times the amount planted prior to 1966. The program placed Brazil fourth in the world in
reforestation practices, behind the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Id at 725-26.
83 IL&T, supra note 47, § 10.04.
84 Silviculture involves human planning, production, and tending of forests. WEBSTmn's NEw
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 789.
85 The most devastating of these problems is the time lag inherent in forestry research: a
growth cycle measured in decades as opposed to months for grains. Most silviculture methods
were developed in temperate zones and their applicability to tropical regions is doubtful. How-
ever, the substantial delays in economic returns for tropical forest research investments due to the
time lag make the needed extensive research and technological breakthroughs for tropical silvicul-
ture unlikely to occur for several decades. Further, a 1970 study found that increased fertilization
and a shorter rotation period resulted in a 38% increase in Douglas fir production, while costs,
especially energy subsidies, increased 64%. The higher the energy costs, the greater the need for
attention to indigenous species, which are naturally adapted to climate and soil conditions. 2
GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 325-26.
86 The great ecological diversity of tropical forests, which makes them extremely stable under
natural conditions, also makes them exceptionally vulnerable to permanent damage when natural
conditions are altered. Efforts to shorten the rotational cycle have so far resulted in higher costs
than benefits. See supra note 85. Recent research indicates that the loss of nutrients following a
clear-cutting operation in tropical regions could be catastrophic even with replanting. There is
evidence that uniformly aged trees do not stabilize watersheds as well as natural forests. Further,
as with grains, pests and pathogens will likely evolve ways to overcome the defenses of single
strains of trees grouped together. This problem was virtually non-existent in the highly diversified
natural jungle. Thus, pesticides and fertilizers will be required which will likely affect flora,
fauna, lakes, and streams. Instead of the natural forest filtering and purifying air and water, the
intensively managed forest may become a source of pollution. 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra
note 32, at 326.
87 Id
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There is increasing environmental concern in Brazil over the Ama-
zon region. Environmental groups have raised a strong voice pro-
testing what they see as government inaction in neglecting to pass
effective legislation or enforce the legislation now in effect.88 The ever-
increasing rate of deforestation lends credence to their cries. According
to Landsat, the United States survey satellite, current estimates of the
amount of deforested wasteland in the Amazon basin range from
three89 to ten percent. 90  Even using the low estimate, land covering
almost ten times the amount of area replanted (3.75 million acres) has
been left as a degraded wasteland (thirty-six million acres-about the
size of Ilinois.)91 However, the crucial question is not the present
amount of deforestation, but the rate at which the jungle is disappear-
ing.92 There was an 150% increase in the rate of deforestation from
1975 to 1978. 93 By the year 2000, at least forty percent of the forest
cover in less developed countries will be gone,9" and at the current rate,
some scientists feel that the entire Amazon jungle will have virtually
disappeared.
95
In response to economic, environmental, and political pressures,
the Brazilian government has recently sought greater control over for-
eign development of the Amazon. The government passed legislation
to restrict foreign acquisition of rural lands and foreign investment in
"national security zones," which include priority areas of Amazonia.
Recently-enacted financial measures limit foreign access to local
financing and reduce the permissible foreign equity share.96 Besides
aiding the Brazilian economy and balance of trade, these methods give
the government greater control over corporate activity and major new
investments.97 The question still remains whether environmental con-
88 Kelly & London, New Jungle Cry: "Amazon is Money,' supra note 66. Orlando Valverde, a
former naval officer who heads one Brazilian environmental group, stated: "The jungle is being
given over to the corporations and there are no laws to stop them. ... Id Some in the Brazil-
ian government agree. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
89 Kelly & London, The Last Frontier, supra note 14.
90 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 330.
91 Id at 127.
92 Kelly & London, The Last Frontier, supra note 14.
93 Id
94 1 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & U.S. STATE DEP'T., THE GLOBAL 2000 RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2 (1980).
95 Kelly & London, Conquest ofthe Amazon, supra note 15.
96 IL&T, supra note 47, § 1.05. Certain mining incentives are available only to Brazilian-
controlled firms. The government of Brazil may consider foreign investors for loans only if Bra-
zilian-owned businesses cannot do the job adequately. In addition, certain sectors, such as com-
puters, have been singled out as "reserved markets" for locally controlled companies. Id
97 Rowland, Foreign Investment in Brazil- Reconciliation ofPerspectives, supra note I1, at 40
(1979). The new laws are still quite amenable to foreign investment, according to Rowland,
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cerns will lead to an altered approach to development with substantial
weight on managing and preserving this valuable resource. There will
be no answer as long as the country's struggling economy and balance
of trade deficit are seen as weighing heavily on the side of rapid, unreg-
ulated development.
F Future in Brazil
The major goals for the Brazilian government over the next few
years include developing alternative energy sources, stabilizing balance
of payments, and improving social conditions via income redistribu-
tion, job creation, and reduction of regional disparities.98 The Amazon
region figures prominently in all these goals. Missing in the midst of
these immediate and pressing problems is a statement about wise utili-
zation and preservation of the Amazon.
The success or failure of a bill now under consideration by the
Brazilian legislature could give a strong indication of the path Brazil
will take in the 1980s regarding the development and preservation of
the Amazon. The Politica Florestal (Forest Policy), a national manage-
ment plan for the Amazon, has stirred fervent and heated debate within
the government. 99 Though the policy itself is apparently not yet public,
its goal is to "harmonize development with the preservation of ecology
through rational, disciplined occupation of the Amazon."'" The pol-
icy would set aside areas for industrial development, farming, Indian
reserves, logging forest, mining districts, and environmental pre-
serves. 1 Many government officials and businessmen believe that the
only way to develop the Amazon while maintaining its ecological bal-
ance is through a clear national policy.102 Mauro Reis, head of the
Brazilian Institute for Forest Development (IBDF), believes such a pol-
icy is the key to managing the forest.10 3 By taking no action, the gov-
ernment is in essence encouraging unrestrained exploitation of the
region. Others, like influential Subminister Paulo Yakota, head of the
through an arrangement involving the sale of know-how to a Brazilian-controlled joint venture.
Id
98 IL&T, supra note 47, § 1.03.
99 Kelly & London, The Last Frontier, supra note 14. While proposals originally called for
600,000 square miles of national parks and ecological preserves, 300,000 square miles of national
forests, and a ban on the leasing of forest lands or timber concessions to corporations, the bill has
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government's Land-Colonization Program, feel that the policy is the
work of radical environmentalists and that it will be scrapped."°
Stressing the need for flexibility and greater use of the Amazon's re-
sources, Yakota maintains that the government simply does not yet
know enough to effectively manage the Amazon through such all-en-
compassing regulation.15 Yakota, noting that his views reflect those of
Antonio Delfim Netto, one of the three most powerful men in Brazil,
intimated that a new policy was needed but would take time. 06
There is presently no effective method for resource planners in
tropical regions to weigh the costs and benefits of transforming tropical
moist forests to other uses.0 7 This makes developing and implement-
ing an enlightened management plan for the Amazon difficult. While
the benefits are relatively immediate and can be measured in economic
gains, the costs are extremely diverse, often long range and not conclu-
sively measurable.10 8 Contrary to the view of many scientists and gov-
ernment officials, Yakota does not feel time is of the essence. "[Olur
inefficiency will prevent us from cutting down too much of the
forest." 10 9
While passage of the Politica Florestal in an undiluted form would
almost assuredly limit opportunities for foreign investment by placing
further restraints on Amazon development projects, it is not clear
whether scrapping the policy would increase or even preserve the pres-
ent level of foreign investment. Environmentalists and nationalists in
Brazil's government have come down strongly against further foreign
investment in the Amazon. They have proposed a code of conduct for
transnational corporations, which passed the Chamber of Deputies in
1979 and is now before Congress, along with a host of other bills re-
stricting foreign investors." 0 The code calls for harsh penalties on
transnational corporations (TNCs) for a wide variety of vaguely de-
fined offenses."' In 1980, Congress appeared to favor the bill and its
passage looked promising." 2 More recently, however, it has been
viewed mainly as a campaign device.I" In addition, President Figueir-




107 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 132.
108 Id See also infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
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110 IL&T, supra note 47, § 1.05.
III Id
112 1980 Bus. LATIN AM. (Bus. INT'L CORP.) 154-55 (May 14, 1980).
113 IL&T, supra note 47, § 1.05.
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necessary.1 14 Other legislation that will almost certainly pass involves
new incentives for mining and agricultural projects in the Carajas re-
gion of the eastern Amazon, where vast deposits of iron, manganese,
copper, and other minerals have been discovered.115 Further, while
TNCs have frequently been on bad terms with the government over the
recent austerity program,' 16 which has stirred renewed nationalist fer-
vor against foreign corporations,117 the official government attitude to-
wards TNCs seems to be one of accommodation and support.
18
Brazilian leaders favor the continued development of transnational
corporations in Brazil because TNCs help ease the country's balance of
trade difficulties, help supply Brazil's growing internal markets, and
provide lessons in jungle development at someone else's expense. 19
. Conclusion
The growing emphasis on ecological issues in Brazil, initially trig-
gered by greater scientific awareness, is today attributable to the de-
114 1d
115 Id at 21. Similarly, increased mining of bauxite in the Amazon region could turn Brazirs
aluminum trade deficit of 140-180 million dollars per year into earnings of over $600 million, thus
making bauxite mining another very likely candidate for government incentives. 1980 Bus. LATIN
AM. (Bus. INT'L CORP.) 122 (Apr. 16, 1980).
116 Rhodia, the Brazilian subsidiary of Rhone Poulenc, a French corporation, publicly blamed
government restrictions and austerity programs for its poor 1979 performance. Many other firms
privately agreed. 1980 Bus. LATIN AM. (Bus. INT'L CORP.) 169 (May 28, 1980). A United States
billionaire, Daniel Ludwig, threatened to shut down his adventurous Jari project unless the gov-
ernment came through with promised financial relief and resolved some persistent bureaucratic
problems. Hoge, Ludwig May Cut Brazil Project, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1980, at D1, coL 4.
117 Ludwig's demands triggered the reappearance of the wallside slogans: "Ludwig get out"
and "the Amazon is ours." The Rio daily Jornal do Brasil intoned that "the Brazilian political
system should have no difficulty acting through Congress and aided by a free press, in barring the
federal government from bailing Mr. Ludwig out of his own business collapses." Hoge, supra note
116. In January, 1982, Ludwig gave up on his ambitious and unprecedented Amazon project,
selling it to a group of Brazilian businessmen and writing off most of the billion-dollar loss. A
combination of factors, including the bureaucratic difficulties of dealing with the Brazilian gov-
ernment and the initial heavy losses incurred because of early mistakes, precipitated Ludwig's
withdrawal. It is interesting to note that the managers at the Jari project feel that most of the
physical obstacles have been overcome, and they cite first-time profits in 1981 as evidence that the
project is beginning to work. Kelly & London, Amazon Pioneer Gives Up With Goal in Sight,
Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 24, 1982, at 44, coL 1.
118 As stated by the powerful Planning Minister, Antonio Delfim Netto, in response to Daniel
Ludwig's threats to paralyze his multimillion dollar development project at Jai: "The time has
come when Ludwig should stop being treated like a foreign body in this country. We will give
him the support he needs to guarantee the project." Hoge, supra note 116. While the govern-
ment's position has not changed, Ludwig's withdrawal from his Jari project reflects the growing
strength of government opposition parties. Kelly & London, Amazon Pioneer Gives Up With Goal
in Sight, supra note 117.
119 Hoge, supra note 116.
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mocratization of the country. With the rise of a free press and the
advent of political opposition (there will be at least four legitimate par-
ties competing in the 1982 elections'20) the environment has become a
public issue. Once a democratic government has embarked on some
sort of environmental program, the resulting momentum tends to cre-
ate an even greater public demand for further action and
enforcement.'21
The Amazon region embodies both the short and long term hopes
of Brazil for everything from industrial and capital development, gross
national product and the balance of trade deficit, to the agricultural
and land needs of a large population. Because of the immediacy of
Brazil's present needs, the government is unlikely to pass strong, effec-
tive environmental legislation and enforce it strictly before the Amazon
is in very serious danger. Government financial incentives to multina-
tional corporations for development remain attractive today, though
they have been cut back somewhat in recent years in response to eco-
nomic and political pressures. Perhaps the greatest Brazilian barrier to
foreign investment in Amazon development is the Amazon jungle it-
self, its inaccessibility, and its exceedingly complex and fragile
ecosystem.
II. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In recent decades, as the levels of world environmental awareness
and social consciousness have risen, a number of regional and interna-
tional organizations have addressed the problems of development of
the tropical moist forest. International interest in the Amazon region
was a natural reaction as people understood more about the extraterri-
torial effects of both environmental degradation and the poverty and
lack of development in third world nations.
A. Extraterritorial Effects
The first and most obvious reason for interest in the development
of the Amazon region is that the jungle extends beyond the borders of
Brazil into seven other South American countries.'2 2 Additionally,
however, development or destruction of the Amazon will have
120 IL&T, supra note 47, § 1.05.
121 Zalob, Approaches to Enforcement of Environmental Law." An International Perspective, 3
HASTINoS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 299 (1980).
122 EightAmazon Nations SignAccordon Development, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at A5, col 1.




profound environmental, economic, and social effects on the rest of the
world. World concern is further magnified by the fact that the destruc-
tion of Amazon jungle is typical of the kind of exploitation occurring in
tropical moist forests (TMFs) around the world.
123
There will be a variety of concrete losses in the world's supply of
goods if the Amazon and other TMFs continue to be severely degraded
or destroyed. The supply of fuel woods,124 fiber, and resin would di-
minish. 125 As evidenced by the depletion of the soil from controlled
farming in Brazil, a valuable present and future agricultural source
may be wasted. 26 TMFs are also a valuable source of drugs, and the
potential for future discoveries is virtually unlimited.127 Natural pesti-
cides are another useful product developed by jungle species.
12
Other losses not as easily quantifiable are perhaps even more dra-
matic. Many ecologists are concerned to varying degrees over the so-
called "greenhouse effect," a general warming of the earth's atmos-
phere because of the increase in carbon dioxide released and not reab-
sorbed. 29 There has been a steady increase in atmospheric carbon
dioxide for many years, and it has recently become apparent that the
widespread burning of TMFs is contributing significantly to this in-
crease. 130 G.M. Woodwell, Director of the Ecosystem Center at the
Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, thinks
that the destruction of TMFs is having an effect now, though "it may
not be easily measured until 1990 or 2000." '31 One disastrous scenario
advanced by scientists predicts that a two degree rise in world tempera-
ture within seventy years will cause a melting of the polar ice caps,
raising the sea level twenty-three feet and putting most coastal cities
under water. 132 A less speculative problem is that of water supply.
Half of the rain that falls on the Amazon region is initially evaporated
from the jungle, the other half from the oceans. 133 Extensive work by
Eneas Salti, head of Brazil's National Institute for Amazon Research
123 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 125-33.
124 Id at 133.
125 Governments Move to Stem Amazon Destruction, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1979, at C3, col. 1.
126 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 32.
127 Governments Move to Stem nAmazon Destruction, N.Y. Times, supra note 125. The jungle
has been called a "huge pharmaceutical factory" by Thomas Lovejoy, Director of the World
Wildlife Fund. Development is Eating Up the World's Rain Forests, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1980, at
E16, col. 5.
128 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 133.
129 Kelly & London, Science Racing Time in Amazon, supra note 78.
130 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 327.
131 Kelly & London, Science Racing Time in Amazon, supra note 78.
132 Development is Eating Up the World's Rain Forests, supra note 127, at E16, col. 4.
133 Kelly & London, Science Racing Time in Amazon, supra note 78.
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(INPA), has shown that deforesting large areas of the jungle could re-
duce rainfall and lengthen the drying season in the Amazon, in other
parts of South America, and possibly even in North America, contrib-
uting to a widespread drying trend.1
4
The jungle is the richest source of genetic variety on earth. How-
ever, once a species of plants or animals is lost, the process is irrevers-
ible and any potential contribution of that species is lost forever.
135
The destruction of a species' habitat through deforestation is usually
sufficient to kill it in the TMF's finely tuned ecosystem.136 Dr. Lovejoy,
of the World Wildlife Fund, estimates that efforts to meet basic human
needs and rising expectations will lead to the extinction of one-seventh
to one-fifth of all plant and animal species over the next twenty
years. 137 The vast potential of this huge stock of "biological capital"
includes sources of building materials, fuel, medicines, nuts, fruits, and
insecticides,'38 and it could be devastating to lose it. Some think that
the most important "species" being lost is the Indians of the jungle,
who know how to live with and use the jungle, and could teach others
how to do so. 139 Industrial and chemical pollution is also likely to in-
crease with unrestrained development of the Amazon. 40 Further, the
jungle is the source of exotic and unpredictable diseases. 141 Careful
study of the jungle and of the Indians who have lived there their entire
lives could be helpful in preventing illness, deaths, or even epidemics.
One further potential problem receiving increasing worldwide at-
tention is the deepening of human poverty and misery because of flood-
ing, the loss of cropland, and the scarcity of fuel wood resulting from
extensive deforestation. 42 These problems would add to the pressures
for massive migration and foster political instability.143 They would
134 Id
135 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 327.
136 Id at 328-31.
137 Id at 328.
138 Id at 329-30.
139 Kelly & London, Science Racing Time in Amazon, supra note 78. Roger Shrimeton, head of
INPA's medical section, voices this opinion. Id While Indians are not being massacred, they do
face a subtle and more pervasive form of extinction. They are in the way of progress and must be
moved. Every time they move, more die. As noted by Charles Wagley, a renowned Amazon
scholar at the University of Florida: "There will be no Indian problem in twenty years because
there will be no Indians." Kelly & London, The Parakana-as Endangered as the IWiderness
They're Part of, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 25, 1981, at 8, col 1.
140 See generaly infra note 217 (efforts to preserve land, water, and air are essential).
141 Kelly & London, Science Racing Time in Amazon, supra note 78.
142 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & U.S. STATE DEPT., GLOBAL FUTURE TIME TO




also lead to increased demand for aid and suppression of less devel-
oped countries' (LDCs') economies, causing a reduction in the market
for products of industrial economies.'"
B. Regional and International Action
The United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment at
Stockholm in 1972 forms a basis for current international thought on
environmental problems. 145 The Stockholm Declaration is an enlight-
ened document essentially setting up a balancing process between the
need to protect the environment and the needs of developing coun-
tries.'4 Among other things, the Declaration emphasizes a responsibil-
ity to safeguard the natural resources of the earth for the benefit of
present and future generations. For example, the Declaration empha-
sizes maintaining renewable resources, guarding against the exhaustion
of non-renewable resources, and safeguarding imperiled wildlife.147
However, the Declaration draws a distinction between LDCs and de-
veloped countries in proclamation 4:
In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are
caused by underdevelopment. Millions continue to live far below the
minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of ade-
quate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sanitation.
Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts to develop-
ment, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and im-
prove the environment.'
48
The tone set by this statement seems to pervade the rest of the docu-
ment. Principle 8 speaks of economic and social development as essen-
tial for improving the quality of life. 149 Principle 9 states that
"environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of un-
derdevelopment ...can best be remedied by accelerated develop-
ment."' 50 Principle 21 adds that states have the sovereign right to
144 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, Supra note 32, at 133. Increasing population coupled with decreas-
ing energy supplies could mean that the rural poor would have to spend more time, and the urban
poor, more money, acquiring fuel This would erode levels of productivity in an LDC, weakening
the LDC's economy, and making the country less able to purchase the products of industrial
economies. Id
145 Declaration on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, Report of the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden, 15-16 June, 1972, U.N. Sales No. E-73-II-A-14
(1973), reprinted in 67 DEPT. STATE BULL. 116 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration].
146 Almond, The Extraterritorial Reach of United States Regulatory Authority over the Environ-
mental Impacts of its Activities, 44 ALBANY L. RaY. 739 (1980).
147 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 145, principles 2-5.




International Law & Business 4:517(1982)
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental poli-
cies, so long as they do not cause harm beyond their borders. 151 Fi-
nally, principle 23 notes that it is "essential in all cases to consider the
systems of values prevailing in each country" and "standards which are
valid for the most advanced countries. . may be inappropriate and of
unwarranted social cost for the developing countries." '152 Though the
Stockholm principles are not legally binding, they do reflect a shared
fundamental policy as a basis for international law.153 The tone set by
the Stockholm Declaration, allowing LDCs to favor development over
environmental preservation, has basically been followed in regional
agreements applicable to the Amazon basin. Two such agreements de-
serve mention: the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, adopted in 1940154 and reacti-
vated in 1976 and 1977 by the Organization of American States
(OAS);155 and the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation of 1978, signed
by eight South American nations.
1 56
The OAS Convention calls for contracting states to "explore at
once the possibility of establishing in their territories national parks,
national reserves ...and strict wilderness reserves ... where such
establishment is feasible, the creation thereof shall be begun as soon as
possible."'157 The Convention also limits the alteration of national park
boundaries, "except by the competent legislative authority," and states
that resources of reserves "shall not be subject to exploitation for com-
mercial profit."1 58 The Convention forbids the hunting, killing, captur-
ing, or taking of certain species of animals and plants listed in. an annex
to the Convention. 159 However, the OAS Convention is silent about
the destruction of a species' habitat resulting in the indirect killing of
the species. Because of this omission and the fact that national legisla-
tures can establish or rearrange national reserves as they desire, the
151 Id
152 Id
153 Almond, supra note 146, at 759.
154 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,
signed Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, T.S. No. 981, 161 U.N.T.S. 193 [hereinafter cited as OAS
Convention].
155 Comment, LegalProtectionfor Rare Plants, 29 AM. U. L. Rnv. 515 (1980). Both Brazil and
the United States are members of the OAS.
156 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, done on July 3, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1045 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Amazon Treaty].
157 OAS Convention, art. 2, supra note 154. Interestingly, the Portuguese translation substi-
tutes the phrase "as soon as convenient" here-perhaps a further reflection of the difference in
attitude of developed countries and LDCs.




OAS Convention appears to be no impediment to a development-
minded country or to the TNCs operating therein.
The Amazon Treaty, signed by South American countries with a
part of the Amazon region in their territory, is an agreement for the
rational development of each nation's respective portion of the Ama-
zon."6 Following the lead of the Stockholm Declaration, the Amazon
Treaty cites as its common aim the development and incorporation of
the Amazon region into each nation's economy to permit a more equi-
table distribution of the benefits and to raise the standard of living. 161
The Treaty also mentions the need to maintain a balance between eco-
nomic growth and conservation of the environment.162 Article IV
stresses the sovereign right of each state to utilize its own portion of the
Amazon region, while article VII calls for research and an exchange of
information between the parties. 63 Article IX also calls for close coop-
eration in science and technological research in order to accelerate eco-
nomic and social development of the region. Pursuant to article XXI,
calling for an annual meeting of top level diplomatic representatives
from each country, the Belem Declaration was signed October 24, 1978,
after two days of meetings at Belem, Brazil. 164 This document reiter-
ated the inseparability of the Amazon basin development and the pres-
ervation of its ecology. The document also stressed the sovereignty of
each nation, labeling this an "asset and guarantee of the development
of the Amazonian territory."'
165
While each of the aforementioned regional agreements is binding
on the parties, they are nonetheless carefully constructed to avoid limit-
ing development in any significant way, leaving total discretion in the
hands of the sovereign national government. National governments
have a tendency to adopt rather narrow views of environmental protec-
tion, taking action only when their own economic interests are directly
threatened. 66 Nevertheless, the policy implications of such regional
accords cannot be overlooked. Today's policy statement is often to-
morrow's course of action.
C. Proposed Future Agreements
Two proposals to develop codes of conduct are currently under
160 Amazon Treaty, supra note 156.
161 Id Preamble to the Declaration.
162 Id
163 1d arts. IV, VII.
164 EightAmazon Nations Sign Accordon Development, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at AS, col. 2.
165 Id
166 Gross & Scott, supra note 44, at 630.
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consideration at the United Nations: one for states with shared natural
resources, the other for transnational corporations. In 1978, the United
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) adopted the final report of
an Intergovernmental Working Group for an environmental code of
conduct for states with shared natural resources.167 The Amazon jun-
gle fits the definition of shared natural resource. 168 Two events could
make this code a factor for TNCs in the Amazon region. The incorpo-
ration of the code into a binding international instrument would create
legal obligations for signatory states. If the extraterritorial effects of
deforestation in the Amazon were to be recognized by other nations as
the cause of significant, measurable environmental harm in their terri-
tories, Brazil and the TNCs operating therein would have a duty to
control, prevent, reduce, or eliminate the adverse environmental ef-
fects. 169 Brazil could also be liable for the damage caused, 170 for fail-
ure to make a prior environmental assessment, for failure to urgently
inform the other states, 17 1 and for failure to take into account the possi-
ble adverse effects of an action regardless of where these effects would
be felt. 172 Even if Brazil did not hold TNCs personally liable for the
damage, the resultant international embarrassment for Brazil would
likely lead to strained relations with the TNCs and strict regulation or
even expulsion of the corporations.
The second United Nations effort, to develop a code of conduct for
transnational corporations, could have a more immediate and direct
effect on United States investors in the Amazon region. The code, be-
ing developed by a group of eminent individuals acquainted with inter-
national economics, trade, and social problems, 7 3 is designed to aid
less developed countries in regulating and monitoring TNC activities to
ensure TNC behavior in accordance with the development goals of the
host country. 74 Another purpose is the harmonization of national laws,
167 Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in
the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More
States, 6 U.N. Env't Program (Agenda Item 11) 9, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.12/2 (1978). Brazil and
the United States both had representatives in this group.
168 A shared natural resource is an element of the natural environment used by man which
constitutes a biogeophysical unit and is located in the territory of two or more countries. Id
169 Adede, United Nations Efforts Toward the Development of an Environmental Code of Conduct
for States Concerning Harmonious Utilization of Shared Natural Resources, 43 ALBANY L. REV.
488, 494 (1979) (principle 1).
170 Id at 505 (principle 12). Damages would be awarded in accordance with the applicable
international laws for environmental damage.
171 Id at 502 (principle 9).
172 Id at 507 (principle 14).
173 The group includes members from Brazil and the United States.
174 Comment, Transnational Corporations: The United Nations Code of Conduct, 5 BRooKLYN
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which would benefit both the home country and the host country. 175 It
would prevent the TNC from shopping for the most advantageous en-
vironment to exploit, while raising standards worldwide, giving TNCs
less incentive to flee the stricter regulations of the developed nations.
176
Dealing with general political, economic, financial, and social ar-
eas, the code has two principles which would directly affect TNCs from
an environmental perspective. 7 7 The first principle (principle F) states
that TNCs should cooperate with goveinments regarding the protec-
tion, preservation, and improvement of host nation environments. This
principle requires TNCs to provide information about the environmen-
tal impacts of their production processes, and inhibits TNCs from seek-
ing "pollution havens" to evade strict pollution controls in the home
country. This principle also envisions minimum environmental stan-
dards to prevent host countries from adopting extremely lenient stan-
dards in order to induce TNCs to locate in their country.
178
The second key principle (principle 8) calls for TNCs to disclose
information of their activities to the public,17 9 enabling host countries
to evaluate whether TNC activity conforms to their legislation, social
objectives, and economic and environmental goals. In response to
TNCs' concerns about the confidentiality of their operations and the
cost of compiling such information, the working group suggests limit-
ing such information to financial statements, TNC structure, sources
and use of funds, employment and investment policies, and accounting
principles. 180 The code may also require a statement of a TNC's envi-
ronmental impact on the area, such as an assessment of the amount of
damage caused and the regeneration time for a forest after a logging
operation.' 8' The United Nations Code of Conduct for TNCs would
increase the cost of doing business in the Amazon because of both the
cost of compiling information for disclosure and the costs necessary to
upgrade facilities or processes to meet the minimum environmental
standards. However, it is not clear whether such an increase in disclo-
sure and environmental standards would be consistent with Brazilian
goals for Amazon development. Although Brazil has not attracted for-
I. INT'L L. 129, 134-35 (1979). Home nations of the TNCs would prefer a code addressed to the
governments of host countries as well, in order to protect investors from arbitrary regulation or
expropriation of TNCs' interests by the host government.
175 Id at 135.
176 Id at 134.
177 Id at 136.
178 Id at 149-50.
179 Id at 150.
180 Id at 151.
181 Myers, supra note 29, at 13.
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eign investment through lax pollution standards, but rather through
financial incentives making it worthwhile for a TNC to exploit Amazo-
nian resources, 182 the code of conduct might impose stricter environ-
mental standards on TNCs in Brazil than the government economically
desires. Thus, the crucial question becomes whether the code would be
merely a set of non-compulsory recommendations dependent on moral
persuasion, the authority of international organizations, and the sup-
port of public opinion to promote the adherence to its principles, or
whether it would have the binding forcq of an international treaty.
III. UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE
A. United States Interests
The United States government has perhaps the greatest opportu-
nity to control the actions of United States-based TNCs in regard to the
environmental consequences of TNC behavior.18 3 However, it may be
in the best interests of the United States to allow subsidiaries of TNCs
maximum freedom in other countries, and to sit back and reap both the
economic and developmental benefits without incurring the costs usu-
ally associated with such benefits. 84 Of course, moral and humanita-
rian concerns, as well as the establishment of a good world image of the
United States, carry some weight in arguing for action by the United
States to help protect the earth's resources for future generations and
prevent the catastrophic economic and social effects of severe environ-
mental degradation.18 5 But such concerns rarely mobilize government
and public interest to the point where action takes the place of rhetoric.
A recent conservative projection compiled by twelve federal agen-
cies and presented to the President predicted a world environmental
crisis within twenty years that would threaten world-wide political sta-
bility and American economic security. 186 The United States Depart-
ment of State and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
prepared a follow-up report intended to prompt public discussion and
the development of government policy. 87 This report details nine
political and economic security reasons that support the position that it
would be in the best interests of the United States to take action to
182 See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
183 See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
184 See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
185 GLOBAL FUTuRE, supra note 142, at xiii-xiv.
186 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at iii.




encourage environmental responsibility in the Amazon region and
worldwide. These are:
1. Availability and prices of renewable natural resources. The
United States supplies much of its own needs, but it is likely that
soaring prices of food, fuel wood, building materials, and paper
would affect the United States if rapid deforestation continues. 88
2. Conservation of the United States renewable resource base.
With world food production likely to drop, pressures would increase
to both overuse and abuse the United States agricultural resources to
the point of depletion of the ground water and desertification in
many areas.189
3. Migration from areas of resource impoverishment. Ecological
refugees from worn-out cropland, barren rangeland, and degraded
forest land could pour into the United States1 90 (e.g., Haitian refu-
gees of recent years' 91).
4. Disputes over water and other resources. As the amount of fresh
water, fisheries, and other resources diminishes, competing demands
could lead to disputes.'92
5. Political instability. Increasing poverty and rich-poor disparities
could lead to frustration, resentment, instability, and violence. 93
6. Energy availability. LDCs' (including Brazil's) conservation and
replanting of forests for fuel wood aids economic development, les-
sens the demand on world oil markets, and reduces the amount of
financial aid needed to buy oil.
19 4
7. Trade. LDCs purchase more than one-third of United States ex-
ports and more than half of our agriculture exports. The success of
LDC development could be vital to the future success of United
States trade. 95
8. Conservation of genetic resources. Medicines, crop varieties,
food, fibers, fuels, building materials, biological control of pests, and
188 1, at xiv.
189 Id at xv.
190 Id
191 Many of the Haitians flocking to United States shores in the 1980s are economic rather than
political refugees, seeking to escape the grinding poverty of a land that has been stripped bare,
especially in the Northwest where the land will not even support subsistence farming. Thomas, In
Northwestern Haiti, People are Princpal Export, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1980, at A22, coL 1. See
also Treaster, Civil Suit Pursuing Asywn for Haitians, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1980, at 13, coL 1.
192 GLOBAL FUTuRE, supra note 142, at xvi.
193 Id at xiv.
194 Id at xvi.
195 Id at xvii.
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other benefits have been drawn from wild species over the years.
196
9. Climate change and pollution. Rising carbon dioxide levels in
the earth's atmosphere could have a global effect in years to come.
19 7
With such substantial interests involved, the next inquiry is what steps
the United States has taken, and might take in the future, with regard
to the environmental activities of TNCs.
B. Unilateral State Action
The United States has a substantial amount of environmental pro-
tection machinery already in place. The National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1970 (NEPA) is a strong statement of the broad
environmental concerns of the United States. 198 This act prescribes en-
vironmental standards for federal agencies and sets up the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to monitor the environment and to for-
mulate environmental policy, a task the CEQ has performed diligently
since its creation.1 99 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) car-
ries out the CEQ policies.200 The actions of the United States carry
much weight both as a model for domestic programs and as a leader in
stimulating an international attack on the problem.201 But this may not
be enough. Cooperative multilateral action, where attainable, seems
preferable to independent unilateral state action, unless, of course, the
only alternative is inaction.'02
Unilateral state action in the international environmental area
may be a concept whose time is coming. States traditionally have re-
lied on territorial principles for exercising jurisdiction, but trends in
environmental law reveal a movement away from these principles, re-
lying instead on shared interests and policies to protect the common
environment.2 3 Today, the interdependence of countries because of
increased mobility, communications, and trade, together with a grow-
ing awareness of present and future responsibility to those who share
the planet, has led countries, especially those with overseas interests, to
196 Id
197 Id at xviii.
198 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4395 (1976).
199 Zalob, supra note 121, at 301.
200 Id
201 GLOBAL FuTuRE, supra note 142, at 68. One benefit of requiring environmental impact
statements (EISs) from federal agencies for any significant international project has been the
growth of EIS procedures in other countries. Yost, American GovernmentalRexponsibililyfor the
Environmental Effects of Actions Abroad, 43 ALBANY L. REV. 528, 531 (1979).
202 Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental lnjury,
14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 95 (1981).
203 Almond, supra note 146, at 759.
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attempt to protect such interests,20 4 as well as the common environ-
ment,20 5 by projecting their policies overseas. Unilateral state action is
already a fact of life in the environmental area.2 "6 The "nationality
principle" of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States allows states to unilaterally establish regulations con-
trolling the extraterritorial activities of their own nationals or corpora-
tions based in their country.2 7 Thus, while the United States could
probably establish environmental regulations for its TNCs operating in
the Amazon region,20 8 it would be wise to consider the potential advan-
tages and disadvantages of such action before discussing the United
States present and future courses of action in this area.
Because a great majority of the TNCs are based in a handful of
developed countries, any unilateral regulation of TNC environmental
activity abroad by the United States could have a wider reaching ef-
fect.20 9 Besides serving as a model and a precedent for other states to
consider, the extraterritorial establishment of minimum environmental
standards and standards of disclosure could have positive environmen-
tal benefits for the host country, its region, or even the world. Such
regulations might promote international agreements if the minimum
standards prove successful.210 Further, according to Nicholas Yost,
General Counsel for the CEQ, requiring environmental impact state-
ments (EISs) of TNCs would evidence a respect for the sovereignty of
host countries, rather than vice versa, by respecting their right to know
if TNCs might cause serious health or environmental problems. Of
course, the host country could then use the information as it sees fit.
211
Extraterritorial regulation could also further a subtle United States se-
curity interest. When other states defer to American standards, they
are accepting standards and a system designed to meet the require-
204 Id at 739.
205 Bilder, supra note 202, at 73.
206 Id at 52. Comment b to section 20 of the R.SETATEmENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES says that a state has jurisdiction to regulate conduct that occurs
outside of its territory and causes effects within its territory if the effect within the territory is a
direct and foreseeable result of the action.
207 Bilder, supra note 202, at 68. Section 30 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREiGN Rn-
LATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES says that a "state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the conduct oc-
curs." Comment f states that this rule is applicable to corporations as well as individuals.
208 Bilder, supra note 202, at 76-77.
209 Myers, supra note 29. Besides Ludwig's Jari project, Georgia Pacific, Xerox, and Heublein
are examples of giant United States corporations engaged in extensive deforestation of the Ama-
zon. Id
210 Bilder, supra note 202, at 81.
211 Yost, supra note 201, at 535.
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ments of the United States.2 12
The disadvantages of such regulation are not insubstantial. In-
dependent state action might tend to discourage the growth of an inter-
national environmental order based on mutual accommodation,
cooperation, and international law. There may be a disproportionate
interference with international trade and other transnational activity.
Inconsistent or conflicting regulations from the home and host states
could make TNC compliance very difficult and costly.2 13 Moreover,
there is the possibility of a substantial competitive risk for the home
state and its TNCs. 2 14 By raising the cost of doing business for its
TNCs, a home country can put them at a competitive disadvantage in
their efforts to operate effectively and to develop new technology in
undeveloped areas. Finally, given the differing perspectives of devel-
opment-minded LDCs like Brazil, and environmentally conscious de-
veloped countries like the United States, it is conceivable that the LDC
could view home country regulation as contrary to its developmental
goals and a threat to its national sovereignty. With Brazil trying to
minimize controls on those environmental harms which it sees as una-
voidable by-products of economic development,215 a more highly in-
dustrialized and concentrated society like the United States might set
minimum standards above those desired by the Brazilian government,
preventing certain projects from going to Brazil.
While both sides have a host of ardent and intelligent supporters
in this country,216 it appears that the United States is not yet ready
unilaterally to expand its environmental regulations overseas. Foreign
policy considerations aside, the political mood within America is pres-
ently believed to be going against environmentalist growth. Malcolm
Baldridge of the CEQ notes that "[the] perception in this Administra-
tion [is] that environmentalism is hostile to the marketplace. 21 7 The
CEQ, an effective and successful environmental watchdog since 1970, is
212 Almond, supra note 146, at 740.
213 Bilder, supra note 202, at 83.
214 Id at 86.
215 The industrial city of Cubatao is a case in point With virtually all industry deemed to be in
the national interest, expensive antipollution regulation is almost non-existent. The city has been
compared to Los Angeles under a constant full-scale smog alert. Frook, The Most Polluted Place
on Earth, PARADE, Dec. 13, 1981, at 42.
216 40 Fed. Reg. 51,657-58 (1975).
217 Reagan is not Killing Environmental Council, but Some Fear He Is Cippling It, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 18, 1981, at 8, col 1. Baldridge appears to be in a minority with his further comment that a
strong environmental program can be justified as good, conservative economics. He believes the
United States cannot have a healthy economy unless long range efforts are made to preserve land,
air, and water. The market is not likely to address these concerns.
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losing sixty-eight percent of its staff and at least one-third of its profes-
sionals because of budget cuts (as of April, 1981).218
The United States should continue, however, promoting interna-
tional awareness of the deforestation problem and supporting key in-
ternational organizations, thereby remaining a key factor in the growth
of international principles. The United States Interagency Task Force
on Tropical Forests, working with representatives of industry, conser-
vation groups, and universities, has analyzed tropical deforestation, de-
fining the United States interests involved and recommending efforts to
develop a new international program, as well as to strengthen forest
management capabilities in tropical countries.219 Another study by the
CEQ and the Department of State, noting the leading role of the
United States in this area during the past few years, arrived at a similar
conclusion. This report urged the United States to continue pressing
for adoption of an international tropical forest plan, strengthening of
the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), fund-
ing for the United States Associate Experts Program,220 and continued
United States support for other international programs, including
agroforestry221 and the protection of critical areas.2m2 While achieving
effective and timely international action is often a difficult task, the ad-
vantages to the United States and its TNCs would be substantial. In-
ternational action would likely serve economic and security interests of
the United States endangered by tropical deforestation with none of the
disadvantages of unilateral state action. Most notably international
standards would be more likely to balance effectively the goals of envi-
ronmental preservation and LDC development, and would not result in
a competitive disadvantage for United States-based TNCs operating
under minimum standards worldwide.
C Environmental Impact Statement
One of the most promising options for environmental regulation of
TNCs was thought by many to be a requirement that corporations file
218 Id
219 GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 142, at 68-70.
220 The United States and other countries' professionals in forestry and resource conservation
lend their expertise to the FAO to help develop the skills and understanding of LDCs.
221 This involves a non-destructive use of tropical lands through the interspersing of tree stands
and crop growing areas.
222 GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 142, at 70-72, 76, 78-82. Certain unique tropical forest ecosys-
tems that are threatened with extinction are set aside as environmental reserves and parks.
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an EIS with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 223 How-
ever, efforts by environmental organizations to compel the SEC to pro-
mulgate environmental disclosure regulations were turned back by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit following seven years of court
battles and SEC proceedings.224 The SEC considered five alternative
EIS proposals: (1) comprehensive disclosures of the environmental ef-
fects of corporate activities; (2) disclosure of corporate noncompliance
with applicable environmental standards; (3) disclosure of all pending
environmental litigation; (4) disclosure of general corporate environ-
mental policy; and (5) disclosure of all capital expenditures and ex-
penses for environmental purposes.225
Environmental organizations argued that the greater disclosure of
information in the EIS was "essential both to sound voting on corpo-
rate policies and to informed consideration of corporate financial posi-
tions, in light of what the disclosed information would show with
respect to environment... costs, and.., the quality of the corporate
management [generally]. 226 On the other hand, corporations argued
that the cost of gathering the information was excessive, especially
when compared to the minimal benefits, since few shareholders were
seriously interested in the information anyway.227 While the benefit of
environmental disclosure to the investor is debatable, commentators
and the SEC agree that disclosure is an effective regulatory tool and
would benefit the environment. There is a certain amount of interest
among investors regarding corporate environmental practices, and
shareholder proposals often cause corporations to alter their behavior
even though the proposals are defeated by a wide margin.228 EIS re-
quirements may focus management's attention on environmental is-
sues, making it more aware of the future costs and legal problems
associated with environmental degradation. Disclosure may tend to
deter questionable practices and elevate the standards of business
conduct.
229
Against this backdrop, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia agreed with environmentalists that the National Environmental
223 Cunningham, Environmental Disclosure in Corporate Securities Reporting, 8 B.C. ENvTrL
AFF. L. REv. 541, 591 (1980).
224 40 Fed. Reg. 51,662 (1975) (record of SEC proceedings on proposed security regulations
regarding corporate environmental impact statements).
225 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
226 Id at 1038.
227 Id
228 40 Fed. Reg. 51,665 (1975) (statement by the SEC in proceedings on proposed environmen-
tal security regulations).
229 Cunningham, supra note 223, at 589.
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Policy Act of 1970230 required the SEC to promulgate internal environ-
mental protection regulations.23 1 The SEC, considering the aforemen-
tioned arguments and its role in corporate regulation, adopted two
compromise disclosure regulations. The first requires the disclosure of
any "material" effects of compliance with environmental laws on the
earnings and competitive position of the corporation, while the second
requires disclosure of any administrative or judicial proceedings
against the corporation arising under environmental laws. 3 2 The
NRDC and other complainants were not satisfied, claiming that the
SEC did not go far enough to discharge its statutory duty under
NEPA .33 The District Court again agreed, and ordered further rule-
making proceedings by the SEC. 4
On appeal, the appellate court reversed and upheld the SEC's re-
fusal to promulgate further rules. 5 Although the SEC record of the
rulemaking proceedings failed to establish either the benefits and ex-
tent of investor interest or the cost of disclosure to the corporation (as
the District Court had mandated in NRDC I), the appellate court de-
ferred to the SEC's expertise. Using a minimum standard of review,
236
the court accepted the SEC's "quasi-legislative" conclusion that the
cost of additional environmental disclosure regulations would be exces-
sive both to corporations and to the administrative agency.?
While the court's decision appears susceptible to criticism on both
administrative and substantive matters, 238 it clearly indicates the SEC's
view that environmental regulation of corporations is largely beyond
the scope of the agency's desires or capabilities. Still, the door remains
open for this kind of regulation in the future by both the SEC and the
court. The SEC is not adverse to socially beneficial regulation. It con-
siders political contributions by corporations "material" for purposes of
230 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976). Section 4333 requires all agencies of the federal government to
"review their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and pro-
cedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies
therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this chapter." Id
§ 4333 (1976 & West Supp. 1981).
231 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) (NRDC
1).
232 Cunningham, supra note 223, at 561.
233 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1939 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
234 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977)
(NRDC n).
235 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
236 Id at 1045, 1049. The standard of review was whether the SEC's action could be said to be
arbitrary and capricious, or, in other words, wholly unsubstantiated by the record.
237 Id at 1058-59.
238 See Cunningham, stpra note 223.
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disclosure.3 9 Further, the SEC indicated its willingness to continue re-
evaluating the need for new disclosure requirements.240 The court ex-
pressed no doubt that the SEC would adopt any environmental disclo-
sure rules it thought necessary, limited only by the broad guidelines of
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." 24 1 However, in spite of these glimmers of hope for the en-
vironmentalist, at present, "an investor has no right to know how other
people are using his dollars to degrade his environment." 24 Further,
while the potential for United States regulation of the environmental
effects of TNCs abroad grows greater and the world grows "smaller,"
the United States has yet to take any action in this regard.
However, while government action lags behind, private industry
has manifested a willingness to cooperate toward the development of
tropical forest management. Industrial research and development can
be vital to underbudgeted, understaffed government agencies in an
LDC. Weyerhauser Company, for instance, is collaborating with other
United States forestry firms in Southeast Asia on a demonstration re-
forestation program. 24 3 Daniel Ludwig's Jari project, once the target of
vocal criticism by Brazilian environmentalists, has more recently been
hailed as a thoughtful and remarkable social and economic undertak-
ing.2' In contrast with other TNCs that have deforested and ravaged
large tracts of jungle, Ludwig replanted every felled stand of timber. In
light of this, it appears that at least some TNCs are taking better care of
LDCs' environments than are the countries themselves.
Optimism over this development, however, must be tempered with
the sobering conclusion of the Global 2000 Report.24 5 Government-
controlled tropical forest management tends to suffer from inefficiency
and the problem of "who will watch the watchman."'  Private enter-
prise, however, is equally unheralded as a solution. Forests are long-
term resources, and economic considerations tend to encourage short-
term thinking. In the words of economics and biotic resource observer
Aldo Leopold:
A system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is
hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate,
239 Id at 587.
240 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
241 Cunningham, supra note 223, at 585-86.
242 Id at 591.
243 GLOBAL FuTuRE, supra note 142, at 77.
244 Hoge, U.S. Magnate, Once Assailed, Is Hailedfor Amazon Project, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,
1979, at A2, col. 3. But see supra note 117.
245 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 32, at 332-33.
246 Id at 332.
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many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but
that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It as-
sumes, falsely, I think, that economic parts of the biotic clock will func-
tion without the uneconomic parts.247
A number of economists agree, and according to Scott Overton and
Larry Hunt of the University of Oregon, conventional economic analy-
sis, which ignores the external benefits of forests to society, as well as
the external cost of deforestation,
must lead to a pattern of high cuts now and lower cuts later ... to shorter
and shorter rotations to the point of depletion of the resource, and to the
conversion of forest lands to other uses until the relative price of forest
products rises sufficiently high that the economic system is in
equilibrium.24 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States and most of the world, including LDCs like
Brazil, are becoming increasingly aware of the global and local dangers
of massive deforestation. Agreements, studies, policy statements, and
even legislation expressing these environmental concerns have begun to
flow in a steady stream from authorities interested in the Amazon jun-
gle. Yet, scientists and environmentalists feel that they are losing the
race against time to save the jungle's resources, while entrepreneurs,
with the courage, foresight, and money, still look upon the Amazon as
the promised land where tremendous gains can be realized.
Brazil finds itself torn by valid but conflicting interests. It needs to
preserve the Amazon region as a continuing resource far beyond the
twenty or thirty years it may take to deforest the jungle. However,
rapid development of the Amazon is seen to be essential to saving Bra-
zil's faltering economy. Thus far, the country's system of regulation
through fiscal incentives has been more effective in promoting develop-
ment than preserving the environment. But technological development
alone is not the solution for the social, economic, and environmental
problems of Brazil. Current proposed legislation seeks to redress this
imbalance. In the near future, any real hope for informed management
of the Amazon's resources will likely come from Brazil.
The future, however, also holds a promise of increased interna-
tional action relating to tropical deforestation. Though regional and
international accords have generally been mere policy statements, ad-
vocating a genuine concern for the environment while realizing the
need for LDC development, current code proposals in the United Na-
247 Id
248 Id at 333 (emphasis at original).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 4:517(1982)
tions could establish global standards for TNC and governmental envi-
ronmental behavior.
The United States plays a significant role in encouraging interna-
tional growth in this area, as well as serving as a model for other coun-
tries' environmental programs. The United States could also take
prompt and effective unilateral action to. regulate the behavior of its
TNCs abroad. Thus far, however, the United States has declined to
take this step. Until the societal benefits of the forest are taken into
consideration, the jungle and its benefits will continue to slip away and
will be sadly reduced in size and quality by the end of the century. So
while international accords wait for passage or national legislation to
implement their policies, and national environmental legislation goes
unpassed or unenforced, unchecked development brings us closer to
the total destruction of an invaluable resource, the Amazon jungle.
Daniel P. Caswell
